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Abstract  
In Montiel Olea and Strzalecki (2014), authors have axiomatically developed an 
algorithm to infer the parameters of beta-delta model of cognitive bias (present and 
future biases). While this is extremely useful, it allows the implied beta to become 
very large when the response is impatient in the future choices relative to present 
choices, i.e., when there is a strong future bias. I modify the model to further 
exponentiate the functional form to get more reasonable beta values. 
 
 
A note on three factor model of discounting
Seiro Ito
I Introduction: Motivation
When asked about the consumption choices in the future, a respondent may discount the future
beyond what is suggested by standard exponential discounting. For example, an individual may feel
tiring to consider about the choices of distant future. Tired of waiting and thinking about the future,
one may show little tolerance to wait further and choose the larger consumption once it arrives.
Alternatively, a terminally ill patient may discount the utility gain/loss heavily if one is asked about
10 years from now. If the question is posed against the concurrent consumption, there shall not be
such disproportionately heavy discounting.
In Montiel Olea and Strzalecki (2014), authors have axiomatically developed an algorithm to infer
the parameters of     model of cognitive bias (present and future biases discussed in Ainslie and
Haslam, 1992; Laibson, 1997; Loewenstein, 1987; Rubinstein, 2006; Sayman and O¨ncu¨ler, 2009;
Takeuchi, 2011). While this is extremely useful, it allows the implied  to become very large when
the response is impatient in the future choices relative to present choices, i.e., when there is a strong
future bias. In particular, when the accepted future waiting period is short and  is small,  becomes
astronomically large.
In the field study conducted in a township of South Africa, the responses to the questions that
follow Montiel Olea and Strzalecki (2014)’s algorithm suggest the tolerable waiting period to be
long in the present choices but short in the furture choices. Here are the examples.
beta delta present s future s
1: 9.678635e+09 0.2131497 15 0.1250000
2: 1.934672e+05 0.2131497 8 0.1250000
3: 2.618018e+02 0.5783179 11 0.8333333
4: 1.089273e+12 0.3802776 29 0.3333333
5: 5.219914e+07 0.4043368 20 0.3750000
6: 1.853144e+08 0.4993843 28 0.5833333
Responses are shown in each row. present s shows reported tolerable waiting time (switch point)
measured in days in the present choice, present s shows that of future choice. One sees a large
discrepancy between the two, and it is much shorter with future s which shows only a fraction of a
day that the respondents are willing to wait for a larger future consumption. Columns under delta
and beta show implied parameter values. One sees that implied value of  to be too large.
II A model
Consider a plan of day w consumption xa1, day w + s + 1 consumption xa2, and day w + s + 2
consumption xa3. Let the day w as day 0, or today. So we are considering today’s consumption xa1,
day s+ 1 consumption xa2, and the day s+ 2 consumption xa3. Assume that a discount rate  is used
for reference day and its day after, and a dierent discount factor  is used for the rest of future days,
as in usual     model.
Utility under this plan, denoted as rpa = (xa1; xa2; xa3;w; s) = (xa1; xa2; xa3; 0; s), is expressed as
u (rp) = u(xa1) + su(xa2) + s+1u(xa3); ;  2 U2:
Let us consider exactly the same consumption stream, only the day 0 is shifted into the future by
w days. So day 0 is w days from today. We introduce a waiting cost d(w) for waiting until day w
arrives. d(w) acts exactly the same as the discount factor and is assumed to take the values between
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? 1 d(w) with a = 1:1; b = 1:2; k = 1:2: levels, first dierences, rates of change
0 and 1. Utility of a future plan r fa = (xa1; xa2; xa3;w; s) can be expressed as:
u

r fa

= d(w)u(xa1) + d(w + s)su(xa2) + d(w + s + 1)s+1u(xa3):
To be consistent, we will also let waiting for s days will incurr a cost in present choices.
u

rpa

= u(xa1) + d(s)su(xa2) + d(s + 1)s+1u(xa3):
We parameterise d(w) as
d(w) = a b
wk
; a; b 2 [1;+1)2; k > 1 (1)
We choose this doubly exponentiating paramterisation as we intend to impose disproportionately
heavy discounting in the future. Note
d(w + s)
d(w)
=

a b
wk bsk 1
= d(w)b
sk 1;
d(w + s + 1)
d(w)
=

a b
wk b(s+1)k 1
= d(w)b
(s+1)k 1:
As can be seen in the figure, this doubly exponentiated discount function discounts the future at an
increasing speed. This introduces the increasing costs of considering about the further future.
Let us impose sucient restrictions on the consumption stream to set the bounds on parameters.
xa1 = x1; xb1 = x2;
xa2 = x2; xb2 = x1;
xa3 = x2; xb2 = x1;
0 < x1 < x2:
2
Assume that an individual with this utility chooses the bundle b over a: r fa 4 r
f
b . Then:
d(w)u(x2)+d(w + s)su(x1) + d(w + s + 1)s+1u(x1)
6 d(w)u(x1) + d(w + s)su(x2) + d(w + s + 1)s+1u(x2):
Then
s
d(w + s)
d(w)
+ s+1
d(w + s + 1)
d(w)
6 1; (2)
Under our parametrisation, (2) becomes
d(w)b
sk 1s + d(w)b
(s+1)k 1s+1 6 1: (3)
Note that d(w)b
sk 1 6 1 for a; b 2 [1;+1)2 and s > 0, k > 1. When we specify d(w) = c w with
c > 1,  that satisfy (2) with an equality will be smaller than that of eqrefdelta.ubound2.
Next, consider the present consumption plans. Let rpa = (xa1; xa2; xa3; 0; s) be plans of today, s and
s + 1 days later. Then:
u

rpa

= u(xa1) + d(s)su(xa2) + d(s + 1)s+1u(xa3):
If rpa 4 r
p
b , then:
u(x2) + d(s)su(x1) + d(s + 1)s+1u(x1) 6 u(x1) + d(s)su(x2) + d(s + 1)s+1u(x2):
This suggests
fd(s) + d(s + 1)g 1  s 6 ; (4)
or n
1 + d(s)k 1
o 1
 s 6 d(s): (5)
Given d(s)k 1 ' 1 for k close to 1, this increasing speed discounting function reduces the value of 
compared to constant speed discounting function nearly by the factor of d(s) even when we have the
same . When s > 1 and a large b, this scaling down eect is not trivial. With an increasing speed
discount function,  will be larger as we have seen in (3) which further reduces the LHS of (5).
III Conclusion: Reconciling with a too large 
For an individual with increasing speed discounting, we expect her future choice r fa to become
extremely impatient relative to the present choice of same consumption bundle rpa . This reflects that
such an individual is “taxed” by waiting until the future start date and would like to consume a larger
bundle immediately once it arrives. Such an individual would express a very short tolerable duration
s, such as a few hours, that r fa and r
f
b become indierent.
If we use the standard  model, or single exponential discounting, implied  becomes extremely
large because  obtained from the future choice is smaller and s is less than 1 (day). Because  is
derived in (4) by taking a reciprocal, this (1=s) will have a disproportionately large eect on the
implied value. This is what we observe in some of responses in our field data. While it is easy to
dismiss such a response as an error or inability to understand the question, the intention of this paper
is to show it is possible to reconcile it with a rational choice framework.
The intuition behind assuming a doubly exponentiated discounting function is a heavy penalty of
waiting until future. This can be interpreted as wait fatigue or low survival probability felt in the
individual’s mind.
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